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Since the first systematic description of
binocular rivalry byWheatstone, this fasci-
nating phenomenon has provided several
new insights into the mechanisms of visual
awareness (Leopold and Logothetis, 1999).
Binocular rivalry (BR) is the subjective
experience of randomly alternating per-
ceptions pertaining to the two eyes when
they are presented with conflicting stimuli.
Because of its nature, BR enables con-
sciousness researchers to separately inves-
tigate the mechanisms of perception and
conscious experience (Gazzaniga et al.,
2009). Among various descriptions of
this phenomenon, quantum mechanical
descriptions stand out as the most radical.
In a recent innovative work by
Manousakis, the formalism of quan-
tum mechanics is utilized to describe
the conscious experience during BR.
Although the author has successfully
derived the observed probability distri-
bution of dominance durations (PDDD),
his approach undermines some essential
features of conscious perception during
BR. Generally, two kinds of perception
dominate during BR: (1) full dominance
of one eye’s stimulus, (2) composite or
mixed dominance of the two monocular
stimuli (Yang et al., 1992). Our argument
revolves around the latter kind of percep-
tion which is also referred to as transition
phase or transition state.
Classically, simplifications imposed
experimental conditions in which only
full dominance was perceived by subjects
and mixed state’s (MS) duration was mini-
mized. However, many experiments reveal
the diversity in rivalry’s temporal dynam-
ics and specifically the important role
of MS (Hollins, 1980; Blake et al., 1992;
Bossink et al., 1993; Wilson et al., 2001).
Regarding the neural correlates of MS, it
has been shown that the frontoparietal
areas of brain trigger rivalry transitions
(Lumer et al., 1998; Knapen et al., 2011).
It must be emphasized that various studies
on the neural concomitants of BR suggest
that no single neural site or neural mecha-
nism is at work during BR, rather multiple
stages and brain areas are involved (Blake
and Logothetis, 2002).
Many attempts have been made to
model the dynamical behavior of BR, most
of which try to reproduce the temporal
dynamics of BR by reconstructing spe-
cific neural mechanisms (Kalarickal and
Marshall, 2000; Laing and Chow, 2002;
Stollenwerk and Bode, 2003; Freeman,
2005). A major number of these mod-
els ignore MS in order to avoid crip-
pling complications, yet Brascamp and
colleagues show that none of the pre-
vious models is capable of reproduc-
ing the full range of observed dynamics
which includeMS (Brascamp et al., 2006b)
and hence try to develop a new model
(Brascamp et al., 2006a; Noest and van
Ee, 2006). Another group of models of
which Manousakis’ model is an example
capture certain aspects of rivalry’s dynam-
ics without resorting to the underlying
neural circuits (Mamassian and Goutcher,
2005). However, in order to obtain the
PDDD, Manousakis employs some tem-
poral parameters characterizing neuronal
firings. This is an interesting achievement
because it ties the dynamics of conscious
perception to specific firing patterns.
Like the classical models, Manousakis’
model only treats the two dominance
states which are represented by two quan-
tum states, while MS is ignored. The
author compares his theoretical PDDD
with the observed PDDD of classical
experiments (Levelt, 1968; Lehky, 1995)
which did not record the mixed states’
duration separately. We believe that the
quantum states are only symbols which
are manipulated according to the quantum
formalism, and bear no resemblance to the
perception they represent. Therefore, in
Manousakis’ approach, only the number
of states and their associated probabilities
determine the favored PDDD. Therefore,
unlike classical models, the scope of the
quantummechanical model can be readily
extended by introducing a third quantum
state which represents MS. In order to test
the newmodel, its PDDD should be calcu-
lated and compared against that of experi-
mental data which are separate recordings
of dominance durations of the three states.
It must be emphasized that the probability
distribution is not a complete description
of the dynamics of BR, and it is necessary
to extract other relative quantities from the
model in future works.
It is worthwhile discussing another
work by Conte and colleagues who
showed that mental states follow quantum
mechanics during the conscious bi-stable
perception of ambiguous figures (Conte
et al., 2009). Their model shares a lot of
features with that of Manousakis, with
the exception that they take into account
the periods when their subjects report
indeterminate perception. Indeterminate
perception resembles MS in that they are
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both mental states and are mediated by
specific neural correlates. But Conte et al.
represent indeterminacy state by the wave-
function of the two-state system rather
than an additional third quantum state.
Technically, a wave-function is a super-
position of all the real possible states of a
quantum system. We believe that this is an
inappropriate take on the problem which
leads to inconsistencies within the model.
The developers of these two quantum
mechanical models believe that the actu-
alization of each quantum state is equal
to the activation of neural correlates of
consciousness (NCC) of the correspond-
ing perception; a state is actualized when
a quantum system is measured (observed)
and subsequently its wave-function “col-
lapses” to that constituent state. Therefore,
we believe that wave-function is not a
legitimate representation, because it does
not describe a real state of a system and
is doomed to collapse, and on the other
hand, specific NCC of MS or that of inde-
terminate perception demands a distinct
associated quantum state.
Manousakis’ neglect of MS might be
justified by the presumption that this state
only functions as a bridge between the two
dominance states. That is, MS does not
compete with the other two and is not
involved in rivalry. It is noteworthy that
the term “transition” has led to a misun-
derstanding, namely that the MS occurs
only when the perception is being switched
from one eye to another. But as is often
the case with BR experiments, subjects
report the same perception as the one that
was dominant before MS. Hence, there
is no particular regular periodic alterna-
tion between dominance and suppression
(Mueller and Blake, 1989; Brascamp et al.,
2006b). We believe these indicate that
MS is not a mere bridge connecting the
two dominant states, but a state which
dominates consciousness randomly and
therefore, enters statistical calculations of
quantum mechanics.
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